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I. INTRODUCTION
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) Section 1-207 has generated a great
deal of controversy in the last twenty years by commentators and courts alike.'
The focus of the controversy hinges on a single question: Does UCC Section 1-
207 supersede the common law doctrine of accord and satisfaction as applied to
the "full payment check?" 2 The answer varies, but it appears that the majority
of authorities who have addressed the issue allow the common law to survive
the UCC.3
1 For a discussion of UCC § 1-207 and the full payment check, see generally, WHrrE
& SUhiMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE,
§§ 13-24, 689-92 (1988); CALAMARI & PERILLO, CONTRACTS, §§ 5-16, 4-11 (1987);
Rosenthal, Discord and Dissatisfaction: Section 1-207 of the Unifonn Commercial Code, 78
COLUM. L. REV. 48 (1978); Grosse & Groggin, Accord and Satisfaction and the 1-207
Dilemma, 89 COMM. L.J. 537 (1984) [hereinafter referred to as Dilemma]; Grosse &
Groggin, 7he 1-207 Dilenna Revisited, 16 N. KY. L. REV. 425 (Sept. 1989) [hereinafter
referred to as Dilemna Revisited]; Walter, 77 Rise and Fall of U. C. C. Section 1-207 and
the Full Pa)nent Check- Checkmate?, 21 LoY. L.A.L. REv. 81 (1987); Shanker, The
Folly of Full Settlement Checks-and a Declaration of their Independence, 90 COMM. L.J.
7 (1985); Carabello, 7he Tender Trap: U.C.C. Section 1-207 and Its Applicability to an
Attempted Accord and Satisfaction by Tendering a Check in a Dispute Arising from a Sale of
Goods, 11 SErON HALL L. REV. 445 (1981); Fry, You Can't Have Your Cake and Eat It
Too: Accord and Satisfaction Survives the Unifonn Commercial Code, 61 N.D. L. REV. 353
(1985); Del Duca, Handling "Full Paynnt" Cecks, 13 U.C.C. L. 195 (1981); Note,
Contracts- Section 1-207 of the Unifomt Commercial Code Not Intended to Apply to
Doctrine of Accord and Satisfaction, 15 LAND & WATER L. REv. 737 (1980). See also,
Danac, Inc. v. Gudenau & Co., 751 P.2d 947 (Alaska 1988); Horn Waterproofing Corp. v.
Bushwick Iron & Steel Co., 488 N.E.2d 56 (N.Y. 1985); Scholl v. Tallman, 247 N.W.2d
490 (S.D. 1976).
2 The "full payment" check is also known as the "conditional" check or the "full
satisfaction" check. Each refers to the situation where the debtor sends a check to the
creditor for less than the amount allegedly due. By using a check marked with payment in
full language, the debtor intends to extinguish the entire debt upon the creditor's acceptance
through negotiation of the check.
3 See Rosenthal, supra note 1; Dilemma, supra note 1; Dilemma Revisited, supra note
1; Fry, supra note 1.
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Ohio, however, recently joined the minority in a 1989 decision-AFC
Interiors v. DiCello.4 In this case, the plaintiff, AFC Interiors (AFC), and the
defendant, DiCello, orally agreed that AFC would perform interior decorating
services for DiCello at his condominium. When DiCello did not pay AFC's
billing, AFC sued. DiCello responded by sending a letter to AFC stating that
he was returning items not wanted and enclosing "a check in the full amount on
the items [he] decided to keep." 5 AFC received both the returned items and the
check, crossed out DiCello's "payment in full" notation, inserted "payment on
account," and cashed the. check. DiCello then filed for summary judgment,
arguing that AFC's cashing of the full payment check amounted to an accord
and satisfaction of the debt.
Both the trial and appellate courts agreed with DiCello. The Ohio Supreme
Court, however, disagreed, stating that "[iun light of the language of R[evised]
C[ode] 1301.13 [UCC 1-207], we do not believe that the special endorsement
by AFC reserving its rights and subsequent negotiation of the check should
continue to be recognized as an accord and satisfaction." 6 This Comment will
review this decision and its viability in the face of the conflicting majority
opinions. Part II will describe the common law doctrine of accord and
satisfaction and full payment checks; Part III will explore the legislative history
of Uniform Commercial Code Section 1-207 and the conflict between this
section and the common law; Part IV will discuss leading cases by courts that
have addressed the conflict; and finally, Part V will evaluate AFC Interiors in
light of the history and cases. 7
II. THE COMMON LAW DOCTRINE OF ACCORD AND SATISFACTION
An "accord" is a new agreement substituted for an old agreement;
"satisfaction" is the execution or performance of that new agreement. 8 Four
elements constitute an accord and satisfaction: proper subject matter, competent
parties, mutual assent, and consideration. 9 At English common law, before the
4 46 Ohio St. 3d 1, 544 N.E.2d 869 (1989).
5 Id. at 7, 544 N.E.2d at 874 n.1.
6 Id. at 3, 544 N.E.2d at 871.
7 Throughout this Comment, the Uniform Commercial Code will be referred to as
"UCC" or "Code," and the OHIO REVISED CODE § 1301.13, embodying UCC § 1-207,
will be referred to as "section 1-207" for simplicity. Unless otherwise stated, cites to the
UCC shall refer to the 1978 official version.
8 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 281 (1981); Hearst Corp. v. Lauerer,
Markin & Gibbs, Inc., 37 Ohio App. 3d 87, 89, 524 N.E.2d 193, 195 (1987) (quoting
Aeronsonic Instrument Corp. v. NuTone, Inc., 80 Ohio Law Abs. 289, 152 N.E.2d 739
(Ohio C.P. 1958)). See also 15 OHIo JuR. 3d 538 (1979); BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 16
(6th ed. 1991).
9 Shady Acres Nursing Home v. Rhoades, 7 Ohio St. 3d 7, 9, 455 N.E.2d 489, 490
(1983).
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doctrine of accord and satisfaction emerged, "a promise to pay, or payment, of
a lesser amount was held insufficient consideration to discharge a debt for
more, unless . . . something else (a 'horse, hawk, or robe') was thrown into
the bargain."' 0 American law agreed but applied this limitation only if the debt
was liquidated, undisputed, and due. 11 If any of these factors were missing,
"the new promise of performance [was] binding and the performance effected a
discharge." 12 Thus, in order to meet the consideration requirement of accord
and satisfaction, a bona fide dispute must exist between the parties at the time
the accord offer is made; that dispute must concern the amount due and/or the
nature of performance still due under the original contract; and the accord must
intend to compromise the performance (or claimed performance) which is
unliquidated (or in dispute). 13 The consideration for this accord is found in the
mutual assent of the parties to accept something less than each contends is his
or her right. For example, a party may waive the right to sue on the unpaid,
disputed balance. "As long as there is a bona fide dispute, it is not even
necessary to establish that there is reasonable doubt which party would succeed
at a trial." 14
In the full payment check situation, a debtor submits a check to the creditor
for less than the full amount in dispute and marks the check with phrases such
as "payment in full" or "full payment of the debt owed." This check then
becomes the "offer" for the accord. Previously under Ohio law, the creditor
had two options upon receipt of the full payment check: 1) return the check to
the debtor as insufficient, or 2) retain the check in accord and satisfaction of the
debt. 15 In fact, the accord and satisfaction could not "be consummated unless
the creditor accept[ed] the lesser amount with the intention that it constitute[d] a
settlement of the claim." 16 As a result, the creditor could not accept the check
as partial payment by crossing out the debtor's notation and substituting
reservation of rights language, unless the debtor expressly or impliedly
withdrew her stipulation.17
10 Rosenthal, supra note 1, at 52 (citing Foakes v. Beer, 9 App. Cas. 605 (H.L. 1884)
(emphasis added)). See also Carabello, supra note 1, at 446-47.
11 Rosenthal, supra note 1, at 52 n.21; Walter, supra note 1, at 85; Carabello, supra
note 1, at 447-49.
12 Rosenthal, supra note 1, at 53.
13 Dilemma Revisited, supra note 1, at 426.
14 Fry, supra note 1, at 356.
15 Shady Acres Nursing Home v. Rhoades, 7 Ohio St. 3d 7, 9, 455 N.E.2d 489, 490
(Ohio 1983).
16 Id.
17 Inger Interiors v. Peralta, 30 Ohio App. 3d 94, 95, 96, 506 N.E.2d 1199, 1199-
1200, 1201 (1986). See also Air Van Lines, Inc. v. Buster, 673 P.2d 774, 779 (Alaska
1983); Kilander v. Blickle Co., 280 Or. 425, 429, 571 P.2d 503, 505 (1977) (court
suggested that payee has option of collecting the tendered final payment "under protest"
unless the debtor expressly demands waiver of that option).
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The common law doctrine did not allow the creditor to take advantage of
the offer's benefits without also accepting its burdens.' 8 Typically, one of three
justifications was used to bind the creditor under the accord: 1) the creditor was
using the debtor's property (the check) in violation of the conditions under
which it was offered; 2) the creditors action of depositing the check spoke
louder than the words of reservation she wrote on the check, and such action
inferred assent to the debtor's offer; or 3) under general contract law, the
offeror was the master of his or her offer. 19 "Deciding whether to take what is
now available or to wait and see whether one can get more in the long run is
the [classic] choice a litigant makes every time a settlement is offered" and is
not peculiar to the full payment check situation.20
Thus in AFC Interiors, AFC was put on notice by both the language on the
check and the letter DiCello sent with the check, that DiCello intended his
payment to be an offer in full settlement of his account. At that point, AFC had
the choice of accepting the offer as presented or rejecting it in its entirety. By
depositing the check, AFC made its decision, and the reservation of rights
language should have been treated as a failed attempt to modify the offer. 21
III. THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SECTION 1-207
A. The History of UCC 1-207
Originally, Professor Karl Llewellyn, the chief drafter of the UCC,
included section 1-207 in the Uniform Revised Sales Act in a series of sections
aimed "'at smoothing the course of performance.'" 22 In early drafts of the
Code, section 1-207 was placed within Article 3 and co-existed with a later-
deleted section 3-802(3) that allowed the full payment check to operate as an
accord and satisfaction unless the debtor took unconscionable advantage of the
situation. Section 3-802(3) provided:
Where a check or similar payment instrument provides that it is in full
satisfaction of an obligation, the payee discharges the underlying obligation by
18 A. CORBIN, CONTRACrS, §§ 1277, 1279 (1952).
19 Rosenthal, supra note 1, at 54-55; Walter, supra note 1, at 82-83; Carabello, supra
note 1, at 450. See also Hearst Corp. v. Lauerer, Markin & Gibbs, Inc., 37 Ohio App. 3d
87, 90, 524 N.E.2d 193, 196 (1987) (quoting Kiser v. Wilberforce Univ., 33 Ohio Abs.
438, 35 N.E.2d 771 (Ohio C.P. 1941)).20 Fry, supra note 1, at 357-58.
21 See, e.g., E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACrs § 3.13, 138 (1982).
22 McDonnell, Purposive Interpretation of the UCC: Some Implications for
Jurisprudence, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 795, 827 (1978).
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obtaining payment of the instrument unless he establishes that the original
obligor has taken unconscionable advantage in the circumstances. 23
At the time, this section attempted to embrace and expand the common law
doctrine of accord and satisfaction as the doctrine applied to full payment
checks by allowing these checks to operate as settlements even when the claim
was liquidated or undisputed. 24
In 1950, section 1-207 was pulled from Article 3 and placed in the
Introductory Article.25 For six years, from 1950 to 1956, both sections 1-207
and 3-802(3) co-existed peacefully within the UCC. No cross references were
listed between the Comments of the two sections, and no changes were made to
either section when section 1-207 was moved to the Introductory Article.26
Although section 1-207 and section 3-802(3) could be read together,27 this
result was probably not intended by the drafters, especially in light of the
criticism the New York State Law Revision Commission gave section 1-207 in
its report. The Commission's criticism suggested that section 1-207 would be
unjust in situations other than those specifically covered by section 2-607(2)
(regarding buyer notification of a seller's breach for nonconformity) because
section 1-207 suggested to the New York Commission an undesired policy of
allowing one party to unilaterally reserve all rights rather than promote a policy
where one party promptly decides her position in the matter.28
When, in 1956, section 3-802(3) was deleted from the Code because critics
believed the section worked a hardship and was open to abuse by the debtor,
no special Comment notes were added to section 1-207.29 The absence of
amendments to the section or comments appears to imply that each section
applied to different subject matter; if section 3-802(3) addressed full payment
checks, then section 1-207 must have been intended to apply to some
alternative subject matter. 30
23 UCC § 3-802(3) (1952).
24 Fry, supra note 1, at 361. See text accompanying note 13.
25 UCC §§ 1-207, 3-802 (1950); McDonnell, supra note 22, at 827.
26 Rosenthal, supra note 1, at 60.
27 The effect of reading §§ 1-207 and 3-802(3) together would be to provide for the
discharge of the obligation and subject it to a grant of power to the creditor that allows this
result to be overridden by reservation of rights language. Id. at 61.
28 Id. at 60 n.49.
29 Id. at 60.
30 1d. at 63. See also Flambeau Products v. Honeywell Info. Systems, 116 Wis. 2d 95,
107, 341 N.W.2d 655, 662 (Wis. 1984).
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B. The Conflict Surrounding UCC Section 1-207
The conflict surrounding UCC Section 1-207 focuses on the interpretation
given the words in both the statute and the accompanying Official Comments.
The statute provides that
[a] party who with explicit reservation of rights performs or promises
performance, or assents to performance in a manner demanded or offered by
the other party does not thereby prejudice the rights reserved. Such words as
'without prejudice,' 'under protest,' or the like are sufficient. 31
The first Comment that follows this section states that
[t]his section provides machinery for the continuation of performance along the
lines contemplated by the contract despite a pending dispute, by adopting the
mercantile device of going ahead with delivery, acceptance, or payment
'without prejudice,' 'under protest,' 'under reserve,' 'with reservation of all
our rights,' and the like. All of these phrases completely reserve all rights
within the meaning of this section. The section therefore contemplates that
limited as well as general reservations and acceptance by a party may be made
'subject to satisfaction of our purchaser,' 'subject to acceptance by our
customers,' or the like.32
1. Interpretations Which Find that the Common Law Survives
Section 1-207
Courts that rely on the statutory language of section 1-207 usually do so in
one of three ways. In the first method, the court decides the applicability of
section 1-207 by focusing on the words "assent to performance in a manner
demanded or offered." If a creditor scratches out the debtor's "full payment"
language, the creditor has not "assented to the performance in a manner...
offered" by the debtor. 33 For example, D, debtor, owes money to C, creditor.
C has billed D for $1,000, but D believes the correct amount owed is $900 and
writes a check for the lower amount. On the back of that check, D writes
"Payment in full for the Account of D." At this point, D has made a good faith
offer to C to perform, or settle, the account for $900. When C receives the
check, C may accept or reject the offer. If C accepts the offer, C deposits the
31 UCC § 1-207. Ohio's version of § 1-207 is identical to the UCC version and is
found under Ohio Revised Code § 1301.13.
32 UCC § 1-207 Official Comments. Ohio's version of the Official Comments is
identical to the UCC version as found under Ohio Revised Code § 1301.13.
33 Brown v. Coastal Truckways, Inc., 44 N.C. App. 454, 457, 261 S.E.2d 266, 268
(1980). E.g., Barber v. White, 46 N.C. App. 110, 113, 264 S.E.2d 385, 386 (1980); Jahn
v. Bums, 593 P.2d 828, 830 (Wyo. 1979).
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check and effectuates an accord and satisfaction. If C rejects the offer, C must
return the check to D. Should C scratch out the "full payment" language, add
"reservation of rights" language, and deposit the check anyway, C has not
agreed to the performance as offered by D. As a result, section 1-207 would
not apply to the situation, and C would have effectuated an accord and
satisfaction of D's debt for the amount of $900.
A second method used by courts is determining whether the reservation of
rights language used by the creditor is "explicit" as required by section 1-207.
If the language used is not clear enough to reserve creditors rights under
section 1-207, the court will find an accord and satisfaction.34 For example,
use of the words "without recourse" have been held not good enough to
indicate the explicit reservation of rights that section 1-207 requires. 35
Courts using the third method focus on the Code's use of the word
"performance," as opposed to "payment," in the statutory language. This
argument stresses the phrase "performance along the lines contemplated by the
contract" and suggests that if the drafters had intended section 1-207 to apply
to payments (as in the full payment check), the word "payment" would have
been included in the language.36
Courts and commentators that rely on the Comments to provide guidance
suggest that this provision "was designed to permit continued performance of
an ongoing contract, despite a pending dispute" when "one party's
acquiescence in the other's performance ... might, by operation of law, result
in a waiver... [of] rights." 37 This section, then, provides protection for the
acquiescing party who accepts the performance or payment and uses such
words as "without prejudice" or "under protest." 38 If, however, the debtor
expressly states her belief that the disputed amount is as offered in a full
payment check, then the acquiescing party cannot use such reservation of rights
language to protect her rights.39 Such express language by the debtor provides
notice to the acquiescing party that to accept this check indicates agreement
with its terms and effectuates an accord and satisfaction. Such accord and
satisfaction could not then be avoided by using reservation of rights language.
34 E.g., Scholl v. Tallman, 247 N.W.2d 490, 493 (S.D. 1976); Bivins v. White Dairy,
378 So. 2d 1122, 1123 (Ala. Civ. App. 1979), writ denied 378 So. 2d 1125 (Ala. 1980).
35 Bivins, 378 So. 2d at 1123-24.
36 Rosenthal, supra note 1, at 63 (citing Hawkland, 7he Effect of U. C. C. Section 1-207
on the Doctrine of Accord and Satisfaction by Conditional Check, 74 COMM. L.J. 329, 331
(1969)); Walter, supra note 1, at 100. See also Brown, 44 N.C. App. at 457-58, 261
S.E.2d at 268; John Crier Constr. Co. v. Jones Welding & Repair, 238 Va. 270, 274, 383
S.E.2d 719, 721 (1989).
37 Rosenthal, supra note 1, at 63.
38 Id. at 63-64.
39 Id. at 64; Carabello, supra note 1, at 454-55.
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The Comments to section 1-207 make no mention of any intent by the
drafters to displace the doctrine of accord and satisfaction. 4° This omission
seems to indicate that the common law survived the enactment of the Code
because "section 1-103 specifically states that the common law applies under
the entire code unless explicitly displaced by it." 41
2. Interpretations Which Find that the UCC Supersedes the
Common Law
The leading opponents to the majority interpretation are Professors White and
Summers who suggest "that [section] 1-207 gives a different meaning to what would
otherwise be the contract of performance under common law."42 They argue that the
language of the provision allows creditors to keep full payment checks (through the use
of reservation of rights language) without losing their rights to sue for the balance
claimed due. "In fact," they state, "the language of 1-207 fits the partial payment
perfectly. " 43 They also admit, however, that the Comments do not fit the partial
payment as well. The sole support for their conclusion comes from the New York
legislature's debates over enactment of the Code in 1961. In adopting section 1-207, the
New York Commission on Uniform State Laws reported that "[tihis section permits a
party involved in a Code-covered transaction to accept whatever he can get by
way of payment ... without losing his rights to ... sue for the balance of the
payment, so long as he explicitly reserves his rights." 44
While this legislative history is important for section 1-207, it is
controlling only for the State of New York and not for every other state that
enacts the provision. 45 In the four other states that have adopted White and
Summers' position, the state legislature specifically made reference to the full
payment check in their local commentary. 46
40 Fry, supra note 1, at 359-60; Note, supra note 1, at 746-47.
41 Note, supra note 1, at 747.
42 WHrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 1, at 690.
43 Id. at 690-91.
44 REPORT OF THE COMM'N ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS TO LEGISLATURE OF STATE
OF N.Y., 19-20 (1961) (prepared by Professors William E. Hogan and Norman Penney of
Cornell Law School).
45 Rosenthal, supra note 1, at 62. See also Horn Waterproofing Corp. v. Bushwick
Iron & Steel Co., 66 N.Y.2d 321, 329-30, 488 N.E.2d 56, 60-61, 497 N.Y.S.2d 310, 315
(1985) (cited as the leading commercial case on the minority interpretation by HAWKLAND,
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES, § 1-207:02 n.8 (Cum. Supp. 1990)).
46 WHrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 1, at 691. These states are Delaware, Florida,
Massachusetts, and New Hampshire. Id., n.4.
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IV. CASES ADDRESSING THE UCC SECTION 1-207 CONFLICT
A. States Holding that Section 1-207 Supersedes the Common Law
Doctrine of Accord and Satisfaction
New York's decision in Horn Waterproofing Corp. v. Bushwick Iron &
Steel Co.47 is the leading case which finds that UCC section 1-207 supersedes
the accord and satisfaction doctrine.48 In this case, the plaintiff agreed to repair
the defendant's leaking roof, but after two days work, the plaintiff determined
that the entire roof needed replacing and sent the defendant a bill for the work
done. When the defendant challenged the amount billed, the plaintiff reduced
the sum due from $1,241 to $1,080. The defendant, however, remained
unhappy and sent a full payment check in the amount of only $500. Upon
receipt of the check, the plaintiff added "Under Protest" to the defendant's
notation, deposited the check, and sued for the balance of $580. 49
The trial court found for the plaintiff stating that section 1-207 allowed a
creditor to reserve his right to recover the balance due. The appellate division
reversed, concluding that the common law applied and an accord and
satisfaction had occurred when the plaintiff deposited the check.50
The New York Court of Appeals reversed the appellate division stating that
[i]n our view, applying section 1-207 to a 'full payment' check situation, to
permit a creditor to reserve his rights and, thereby, preclude an accord and
satisfaction, more nearly comports with the content and context of the statutory
provision and with the legislative history and underlying purposes of the Code
as well, and is a fairer policy in debtor-creditor transactions. 5 1
The court relied primarily on New York legislative history and the commentary
by White and Summers in justifying its decision. 52 In addition, the court
considered "the nonlimiting language of section 1-207 and its placement in the
Code with other generally applicable provisions of [A]rticle 1 ...persuasive
that the section [was], indeed, applicable to all commercial transactions fairly
considered to be 'Code-covered,"' and that this conclusion was true "[w]hether
the underlying contract between the parties be for the purchase of goods,
47 66 N.Y.2d 321, 488 N.E.2d 56, 497 N.Y.S.2d 210 (N.Y. 1985).
48 Hawkland, Uniform Commercial Code Series, § 1-207:02 n.8 (Cum. Supp. 1990).
WHrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 1, at 692; Dilemna Revisited, supra note 1, at 439.
49 Horn Waterproofing, 66 N.Y.2d at 322, 488 N.E.2d at 56-57, 497 N.Y.S.2d at
311.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 324, 488 N.E.2d at 58, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 312.
52 Id. at 326, 327-29, 488 N.E.2d at 59-60, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 313-15. See supra notes
42-44 and accompanying text.
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chattel paper, or personal services . . "53 Tihe use of a negotiable
instrument [(the check in this case)] for the purpose of payment of attempted
satisfaction of a contract debt is explicitly and specifically regulated by the
provisions of [A]rticle 3 and, therefore, undeniably a Code-covered
transaction. " 54 This result was a change for New York since two previous
lower court decisions had stated that the doctrine of accord and satisfaction still
applied to transactions not within the Code-those relating to services rather
than the sale of goods. 55
The South Dakota Supreme Court has also held that section 1-207
supersedes the doctrine of accord and satisfaction; this court was the first state
high court to do so. 56 In Scholl v. Tallman,57 the defendants sent the plaintiff a
full payment check for less than the amount billed. The plaintiff scratched out
the defendant's "settlement in full" language and wrote "'Restriction of
payment in full refused. $1,826.65 remains due and payable,"' deposited the
check and sued for the balance allegedly owed.58
The trial court agreed with the defendants and found an accord and
satisfaction had occurred. The state supreme court reversed, however, based on
a peculiarity in their common law. South Dakota codified its common law prior
to the adoption of the UCC in that state. Under South Dakota Codified Laws
(SDCL) Section 20-7-4, an accord and satisfaction occurs if the creditor accepts
such in writing.59 In Scholl, no accord and satisfaction could occur when the
creditor cashed the debtor's full payment check because the creditor's
conditional endorsement was an "explicit reservation of rights under SDCL 57-
1-23 [UCC section 1-207] and [was] not acceptance in writing under SDCL 20-
7-4."60 Although the South Dakota court cited to White and Summers and a
New York case for support in its interpretation of section 1-207, its primary
focus was to reconcile its common law statute with the UCC provision enacted
in the state. 61
53 Horn Waterproofing, 66 N.Y.2d at 329-30, 488 N.E.2d at 61, 497 N.Y.S.2d at
315.
54 Id.
55 Dilemma Revisited, supra note 1, at 442 & n.90.
56 Fry, supra note 1, at 366; Walter, supra note 1, at 94.
57 247 N.W.2d 490 (S.D. 1976).
58 Id. at 491.
59 Id. Section 20-7-4 provides that "[plart performance of an obligation, either before
or after a breach thereof, when expressly accepted by the creditor in writing in satisfaction,
or rendered in pursuance of an agreement in writing for that purpose, though without any
new consideration, extinguishes the obligation." S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 20-7-4
(1991).
60 Scholl, 247 N.W.2d at 492.
61 Id. at 491. Rosenthal, supra note 1, at 67.
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Of the thirteen state high courts that have addressed this conflict between
the common law doctrine of accord and satisfaction and UCC section 1-207,62
only two-New York and South Dakota-have found that the UCC supersedes
the common law. An additional four state legislatures-Delaware, Florida,
Massachusetts, and New Hampshire-have adopted this position in their local
Comments. 63 However, one state legislature-Illinois-has adopted special
Comments that come the "closest to what the majority of jurisdictions have
concluded is the intent of the [1-207] section:" that the accord and satisfaction
doctrine survives enactment of section 1-207.64
62 Air Van Lines, Inc. v. Buster, 673 P.2d 774 (Alaska 1983) (followed by Danac, Inc.
v. Gudenau & Co., 751 P.2d 947 (Alaska 1988)); Anderson v. Rosebrook, 737 P.2d 417
(Colo. 1987); County Fire Door Corp. v. C.F. Wooding Co., 202 Conn. 277, 520 A.2d
1028 (1987); Stultz Elec. Works v. Marine Hydraulic Eng. Co., 484 A.2d 1008 (Me.
1984); Cass Constr. Co. v. Brennan, 222 Neb. 69, 382 N.W.2d 313 (1986); Horn
Waterproofing Corp. v. Bushwick Iron & Steel Co., 66 N.Y.2d 321, 488 N.E.2d 56,
(1985); Scholl v. Tallman, 247 N.W.2d 490 (S.D. 1976); Gallagher Lumber Co. v.
Shapiro, 137 Vt. 139, 400 A.2d 984 (1979); Marton Remodeling v. Jensen, 706 P.2d 607
(Utah 1985); John Grier Constr. Co. v. Jones Welding & Repair, Inc., 238 Va. 270, 383
S.E.2d 719 (1989); Flambeau Prod. Corp. v. Honeywell Info. Systems, Inc., 116 Wis. 2d
95, 341 N.W.2d 655 (1984); Jahn v. Bums, 593 P.2d 828 (Wyo. 1979). Cf., Charleston
Urban Renewal Auth. v. Stanley, 346 S.E.2d 740 (W.V. 1985) (court found that a service
contract did not fall under the UCC, but should a contract involving the sale of goods come
before the court, it would hold that the common law was not superseded by UCC § 1-207).
63 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 1, at 691 and n.4. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6,
§ 1-207 (Michie 1990) (Delaware Study Comment states that this section "makes possible
avoidance of the sometimes harsh effect of cases holding that a debt is discharged in its
entirety by acceptance of part payment which the debtor tenders as fall payment of an
unliquidated claim"); FLA. STAT. § 671.207 (1990) (Florida Code Comments state that
"[tihis section offers a device of considerable practical value, in permitting a party to accept
whatever he can get in payment, performance etc. without having to gamble with his legal
rights to demand the balance of the payment or performance"); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 106, § 1-207 (West 1991) (Massachusetts Annotations state that "[tihis section permits a
party involved in a code-covered transaction to 'accept' whatever he can get by way of
payment, performance, etc., without losing his rights to ... sue for the balance of the
payment etc., so long as he explicitly reserves his rights"); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 382-
A:1-207 (Equity 1990) (New Hampshire Comments adopt the same language as the
Massachusetts Annotations, but add that "[a]s to the common law, the section would...
permit acceptance of a part performance or payment tendered in full settlement without the
acceptor gambling with his legal right to demand the remainder . . ., a course impossible
now save where the part tendered is either liquidated or undisputed").
64Dilenma Revited, supra note 1, at 449. See ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 26, para. 1-207
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991) (The Illinois Comments state that "[t]he outcome should depend
on the facts of each case. Paragraph 1-207 should not have a blanket application merely
because a reservation of rights appears on the reverse side of a check which the drawer has
indicated, if accepted, is to accomplish an accord and satisfaction").
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
B. States Holding that the Common Law Doctrine ofAccord and
Satisfaction Survives UCC Section 1-207
The Wisconsin Supreme Court adopted the majority interpretation in
Flambeau Products Corp. v. Honeywell Info. Systems. 65 In this case, the
plaintiff, Flambeau, bought computer equipment from the defendant,
Honeywell, in September, 1975. As part of the sales agreement, Flambeau was
to receive $14,000 worth of programming services for a year ending on
October 1, 1976. Flambeau did not use the programming services and sought
to deduct that amount from its total bill due of $109,412 by sending a full
payment check for the lesser amount along with a letter describing the
deduction. Honeywell cashed the check, notified Flambeau that the check was
not accepted as payment in full, and requested the balance due.66
Flambeau sued for summary judgment on the ground that an accord and
satisfaction had occurred; the trial court granted the motion. 67 The appellate
court disagreed with the trial court,68 but was reversed on appeal by the state
supreme court.69
In finding an accord and satisfaction had occurred, the supreme court
reviewed the legislative history of the Uniform Commercial Code and found it
conflicting and unhelpful. 70 As a result, the Wisconsin high court focused on
the rule of construction set forth in UCC section 1-102:
(a) To simplify, clarify, and modernize the law governing commercial
transactions;
(b) To permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through
custom, usage, and agreement of the parties;
(c) To make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions. 7 1
65 116 Wis. 2d 95, 341 N.W.2d 655 (1984).
66 Id. at 99, 341 N.W.2d at 657-58.
67 Id.
68 Flambeau Prod. Corp. v. Honeywell Info. Systems, 111 Wis. 2d 317, 330 N.W.2d
228 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983).
69 Flambeau Prod. Corp. v. Honeywell Info. Systems, 116 Wis. 2d 95, 341 N.W.2d
655 (Wis. 1984).
70 The court discussed the deleted § 3-802(3) and its reading in conjunction with § 1-
207 which suggested § 1-207 should be read as not applicable to full payment checks.
Flambeau, 116 Wis. 2d at 106, 341 N.W.2d at 661; see also notes 21-29 and
accompanying text. The court also recognized the 1961 New York Commission report as
being "of some significance since New York took a lead in studying the UCC and
suggesting revisions during the draffing of the Code. . .," but that it "has no binding effect
. ..on [this court's] interpretation of the UCC as passed by the Wisconsin legislature."
Flambeau, 116 Wis. 2d at 106, 341 N.W.2d at 662.
71 UCC § 1-102.
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In so doing, the court decided that applying section 1-207 to the full payment
check would neither "'simplify,' 'clarify,' or 'modernize' the law governing
commercial transactions . . .", nor promote the policy of "'continued
expansion of commercial practice.'" 72 In fact, "all that would be accomplished
would be the elimination of the simple technique of the full payment
check .... -73
The court concluded by stating that the long-standing doctrine of accord
and satisfaction rested not only on principles of contract law but on principles
of sound public policy, and quoted Corbin from his Contracts treatise:
It is unfair to the party who writes the check thinking that he will be spending
his money only if the whole dispute will be over, to allow the other party,
knowing of that reasonable expectation, to weasel around the deal by putting
his own markings on the other person's checks. 74
In County Fire Door Corp. v. C.F. Wooding Co.,75 Connecticut joined the
majority of jurisdictions finding that the common law survives section 1-207.
Here, the defendant ordered doors and frames from the plaintiff who delivered
the goods late. Upon receiving plaintiff's bill, the defendant back-charged the
plaintiff for damages caused by the late delivery and sent a check for the
revised amount. The defendant marked the check "Final Payment . . . [and]
[b]y its endorsement, the payee accepts this check in full satisfaction of all
claims against the [defendant] .... "76 The plaintiff crossed out this language,
added that "[t]his check is accepted under protest and with full reservation of
rights to collect the unpaid balance... ,"77 and deposited the check. When the
defendant failed to make further payments, the plaintiff sued.78
The trial court found for the plaintiff "because the amount of the tender
had been no more than the amount the defendant itself had calculated to be due
and owing to the plaintiff." 79 On appeal, the defendant claimed the plaintiff
was bound by the terms of the check when the plaintiff knowingly cashed a full
payment check.80 The Connecticut Supreme Court agreed.81
In analyzing section 1-207, the court reconciled its provisions with those
found elsewhere in the Code, namely Article 3 (negotiable instruments) and
7 2 Flambeau, 116 Wis. 2d at 110, 341 N.W.2d at 663.
73 Id.
74 6 CORBIN, CONTRACrs § 1279, 130 (1962).
75 202 Conn. 277, 520 A.2d 1028 (1987).
76 Id. at 279, 520 A.2d at 1029.
7 7 Id. at 280, 520 A.2d at 1030.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 285, 520 A.2d at 1030.
80 Id.at 280-81, 520 A.2d at 1030.
81 Id. at 291-92, 520 A.2d at 1036.
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Article 2 (sale of goods). Under Article 3, the court determined that the impact
of its various provisions were clear.82
Because the check tendered by the defendant was only enforceable "according
to its original tenor," the plaintiff, by receiving "payment or satisfaction"
discharged the defendant not only on the instrument, but also on the underlying
obligation .... To read section [1-207] to validate plaintiffs conduct...
would, therefore, fly in the face of the relevant provisions of [A]rticle 3, which
signal the continued vitality of the common law principles of accord and
satisfaction.83
In analyzing Article 2, the court found the article had a "close and
harmonious connection" with section 1-207 because Article 2 "recurrently
[drew] inferences from acquiescence in, or objection to, the performances
tendered by one of the contracting parties." 84 The court believed it significant
that the text of section 1-207 repeatedly referred to "performance" because
such performance was a central aspect of Article 2 sales contracts, in contrast
to Article 3 in which instruments were not generally described as being
"performed" by anyone. 85
The Connecticut high court then concluded that "when performance of a
sales contract has come to an end, section [1-207] was not intended to empower
a seller, as payee of a negotiable instrument, to alter that instrument by adding
82 The Connecticut Supreme Court stated that § 3-407 "takes a dim view of the
unauthorized alteration of an instrument" whose effect is to either "discharge the liability,
on the instrument, of 'any party whose contract is thereby changed,' or to continue the
enforceability of the instrument 'according to its original tenor.'" Id. at 1032. By
substituting words of protest for words of satisfaction, the plaintiff risked discharging the
defendant completely, if the conduct was deemed fraudulent. Id. Even if not fraudulent, the
result is supported by § 3-802(1)(b) which "provides that, presumptively, the taking of a
negotiable instrument suspends the underlying obligation 'until the instrument is due,' and
that 'discharge of the underlying obligor on the instrument also discharges him on the
obligation.'" Id. In addition, under § 3-603(1), "a drawer is discharged from liability on an
instrument 'to the extent of his payment or satisfaction.'" Id. at 286, 520 A.2d at 1033.
83 Id.
84 Id. Cited examples include § 2-208 (stating "any course of performance accepted or
acquiesced in without objection shall be relevant to determine the meaning of the
agreement"); § 2-207 (stating that "[b]etween merchants such terms become part of the
contract language unless . . . notification of objection to them . . . is given within a
reasonable time.. ."); § 2-602 ("[r]ejection of goods must be within a reasonable time after
their delivery or tender. It is ineffective unless the buyer seasonably notifies the seller");
§ 2-605 ("[t]he buyer's failure to state . . . a particular defect . . . precludes him from
relying on the unstated defect to justify rejection or to establish a breach"); § 2-606
("[a]cceptance of the goods occurs when the buyer . . . fails to make an effective
rejection..."); and § 2-607 ("[alcceptance of goods by the buyer precludes rejection"). Id.
at 287, 520 A.2d at 1033-34.
85 Id. at 290, 520 A.2d at 1035.
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words of protest to a check tendered by a buyer on condition that it be accepted
in full satisfaction of an unliquidated debt."86
V. EVALUATING OHIO'S DECISION IN AFC INTERIORS V. DICELLO
One method of resolving the conflict between the common law and UCC
section 1-207 is to apply a "purposive interpretation" of the Code, as suggested
by one commentator. Under "purposive interpretation," the legal standards of
the UCC are interpreted in terms of the purposes the drafters sought to
implement.8 7 Professor McDonnell explains that the UCC drafters specifically
established the goals of their work by incorporating the underlying purposes
and policies of the Code in section 1-102(2). 88 The point and purpose of the
Code was to "avoid the complexity, obsolescence, and divergent interpretations
which had plagued prior uniform laws in the commercial field." 8 9 Thus, the
drafters intended to promote uniformity among the states in the area of
commercial law. To help assure such uniformity, the Comments were provided
to give a "fuller delineation of purpose ... to individual Code sections" 90 and
"[a]lthough the comments are not the law. . ., they are utilized by courts more
frequently than any other source when questions of interpretation arise." 91
Professor McDonnell lists four steps to purposive interpretation: 1) Read
all of the UCC statutes to determine their underlying purposes and the
relationship between them; 2) Look for an articulation of purpose in the
Official Comments; 3) Explore how the current statutory text varies from
86 Id.
87 McDonnell, supra note 22, at 797-98.
88 Id. at 798. UCC § 1-102(2) states as follows:
(2) Underlying purposes and policies of this Act are
(a) to simplify, clarify, and modernize the law governing commercial
transactions;
(b) to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through
custom, usage and agreement of the parties;
(c) to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions.
UCC § 1-102(2).89 McDonnell, supra note 22, at 798.
90 ld. at 800. The Official Comment 1 to UCC § 1-102 states that
[tihe text of each section should be read in the light of the purpose and policy of
the rule or principle in question, as also of the Act as a whole, and the application of the
language should be construed narrowly or broadly, as the case may be, in confonnity
with the purposes and policies involved.
UCC § 1-102 Official Comments (emphasis added).
91 Note, supra note 1, at 747.
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earlier drafts of the Code; and 4) Examine the results of steps one through
three for a coherent interpretation. 92
When courts decide to refrain from purposive interpretation and disregard
the purposes underlying the UCC, they do so by using devices that effectuate
their own policy, in opposition to those of the drafters.93 These devices include
1) retreating to the "plain meaning rule;" 94 2) retreating to a pre-Code legal
standard; 95 and/or 3) retreating to authority to find that the Code means what
the authorities say it means. 96
In applying this analysis to Ohio's recent four-to-three decision in AFC
Interiors, the Ohio high court skipped all four steps of purposive interpretation
and decided, instead, to play a "follow-the-leader" game by finding that the
Code means what other authorities say it means. The court only "generally
identiflied] . . . legislative comment, prior case holdings and limited scholarly
comment in declaring that the section was intended to alter or displace the
common law doctrine of accord and satisfaction. "97 The majority "misread and
misapplied the Uniform Commercial Code, ignored the overwhelming weight
of authority in other jurisdictions, and overruled the long-standing decisional
law of this state ... "98
9 2 McDonnell, supra note 22, at 805-09.
93 Id.
94 The plain meaning rule bars parties from using extrinsic evidence to aid the
interpretation of the language in question. Courts using this rule for statutory interpretation
bar "the use of legislative history to interpret statutory language that is 'clear on its face.'"
FARNSWORTH, supra note 21, § 7.12, at 501.
95 See McDonnell, supra note 22, at 816-24. McDonnell cites the case of American
Card Co. v. H.M.H. Co., 97 R.I. 59, 196 A.2d 150 (1963), as an example of this
"retreating" device. In American Card, the court ignored the provided UCC § 9-105(1)
definition of a security agreement (an agreement which creates or provides for a security
interest), and instead used § 9-203(1)(a) to create its own definition. This latter section
"declares nonpossessory security interests to be unenforceable unless 'the debtor has signed
a security agreement which contains a description of the collateral.'" McDonnell, supra
note 22, at 817. The American Card court held, in fashioning its own definition, that the
parties in the case showed no "'evidence of an agreement by the debtor to grant claimants a
security interest.'" American Card Co., 97 R.I. at 61, 196 A.2d at 152. By resorting to this
language, the court used pre-Code, common-law vernacular based on granting clauses in
real estate conveyances and chattel mortgages. McDonnell, supra note 22, at 871.
96 McDonnell, supra note 22, at 824-28. See, e.g., Scholl v. Tallman, 247 N.W.2d
490 (S.D. 1976) (court did not define the policy behind section 1-207 through the language
of the section, the comments, or the history, but only looked to other sources of law).
97 Dilemma, supra note 1, at 559; see AFC Interiors v. DiCello, 46 Ohio St. 3d 1, 6,
544 N.E.2d 869, 873 (1989) (dissent).
98 AFC Interiors, 46 Ohio St. 3d at 6, 544 N.E.2d at 873 (dissent) (with reference to
Seeds, Grain, & Hay Co. v. Conger, 83 Ohio St. 169, 93 N.E. 892 (1910), overruled by
AFC Interiors v. DiCello, 46 Ohio St. 3d 1, 544 N.E.2d 869 (1989), holding that when a
creditor receives a full payment check, that creditor must either accept the amount tendered
upon the terms of the condition, or reject the payment entirely).
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The court began by quoting the Official Comments to Ohio Revised Code
1301.13 (UCC section 1-207) as follows:
1. This section provides machinery for the continuation of performance along
the lines contemplated by the contract despite a pending dispute, by adopting
the mercantile device of going ahead with delivery, acceptance, or payment
'without prejudice,' 'under protest,' 'under reserve,' 'with reservation of all
our rights,' and the like.99
Specific attention was drawn to the phrase "or payment," but the court neglects
to state why the "or payment" has significance on its own. Presumably, it was
to imply that a "payment," and not just "performance," was contemplated by
the drafters of section 1-207. Such analysis, however, would take the phrase
out of context since the Comment begins by stating that "[t]his section provides
machinery for the continuation ofperfonnance along the lines contemplated by
the contract . 100 It is the performance that is emphasized in this
statement, and not the payment as the court incorrectly implied.
The court next mentions in passing that scholars have disagreed on the
correct outcome of this debate and that the court is of the opinion that
the drafters of the UCC and Ohio's General Assembly, promulgated UCC 1-
207 in response to a perceived injustice to creditors that occurs where a
creditor, under protest, deposits a check marked 'paid in full' or the like, and
later discovers that an accord and satisfaction has taken place which
extinguished the right to demand further payment on the debt. 101
This reasoning, however, appears flawed since a leading commentator on this
section found no such intention on the part of the UCC drafters, 10 2 and Ohio's
Revised Code lists no relevant legislative history at all regarding section 1-
207.103
In reviewing relevant cases, the court finds a "discernible trend" has
developed toward the current minority view that allows the UCC to supersede
the common law regarding section 1-207. It cites a North Carolina appellate
case, Baillie Lumber Co. v. Kincaid Carolina Corp.,104 as part of this "trend,"
yet fails to note that a later-decided North Carolina case, Brown v. Coastal
99 AFCInteriors, 46 Ohio St. 3d at 3, 544 N.E.2d at 871.
100 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1301.13 Official Comment 1 (Baldwin 1988) (emphasis
added).
101 AFCInteriors, 46 Ohio St. 3d at 3, 544 N.E.2d at 871.
102 See Rosenthal, supra note 1, at 58-63; see also supra notes 24-30 and
accompanying text.
103 See OHIO REV. CODEANN. § 1301.13 (Baldwin 1988).
104 4 N.C. App. 342, 167 S.E.2d 85 (1969).
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Truckways, 105 referred to Baillie and held that section 1-207 did not alter the
common law.
The facts in Baillie included a billing for lumber sent by the plaintiff seller
to the defendant buyer. No controversy existed over the price of the lumber or
the amount billed. The defendant, however, could not pay the bill and offered
the plaintiff thirty-five cents on the dollar, payable in two installments. The
plaintiff did not accept the offer. The defendant sent the two installment checks
anyway (marking the second one as "final"), on which the plaintiff wrote "with
reservation of all our rights," deposited them, and then sued for the balance
due.10 6
The court held that the debt was liquidated and undisputed so that no
consideration existed for the discharge of the balance due, and thus no accord
and satisfaction occurred.10 7 The court then added that under section 1-207, the
plaintiff did not accept the second check in full payment but rather in the
manner provided under section 1-207.108
Eleven years later, the court in Brown v. Coastal Truckways held that when
the plaintiff struck the defendant's "account in full" language, the plaintiff did
not "assent to 'performance in a manner . . . offered by' the defendant" 10 9
which made 1-207 inapplicable to the case. 110 As a result, UCC section 1-207
did not change the common law. The Brown court then referred to the Baillie
decision "which would support a different result. That case involved a fully
liquidated claim. It is not precedent for this case." 111 In essence, the Brown
decision made the Baillie language dictum for unliquidated debt cases, which is
the situation in AFC Interiors.
The Ohio high court next refers to South Dakota's Scholl case and New
York's Horn Waterproofing case,112 both of which were decided using facts
and circumstances not present in Ohio.113 The Scholl case involved a
peculiarity in the state's common law that worked an accord and satisfaction
only if the creditor notified the debtor in writing of such acceptance, while in
Horn Waterproofing, the New York high court relied on New York legislative
history that specifically interpreted section 1-207 as changing the doctrine of
105 44 N.C. App. 454, 261 S.E.2d 266 (1980).
106 Baillie, 4 N.C. App. at 345, 167 S.E.2d at 87.
107 Id. at 352, 167 S.E.2d at 92. See also notes 8-14 and accompanying text.
108 Baillie, 4 N.C. App. at 353, 167 S.E.2d at 92-93.
109 Brown, 44 N.C. App. at 457, 261 S.E.2d at 268.
110 See note 33 and accompanying text.
111 Brown, 44 N.C. App. at 458, 261 S.E.2d at 269.
112 AFC Interiors v. DiCello, 46 Ohio St. 3d 1, 4-5, 544 N.E.2d 869, 871-72 (1989);
Scholl v. Tallman, 247 N.W.2d 490 (S.D. 1976); Horn Waterproofing Corp. v. Bushwick
Iron & Steel Co., 66 N.Y.2d 321, 488 N.E.2d 56, 497 N.Y.S.2d 310 (1985); see also notes
45-58 and accompanying text.
113 See supra notes 47-60 and accompanying text.
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accord and satisfaction. Neither case supported Ohio's recent decision in AFC
Interiors.
In addition, the Ohio court failed to do any analysis concerning section 1-
207 and how it relates to the other provisions of the UCC-an omission
frequently found in cases by courts who avoid "purposive interpretation"
analysis and simply "follow" other court decisions and commentators without
making an independent analysis. 114
VI. CONCLUSION
The purpose of the Uniform Commercial Code was to promote uniformity
and unity among the various states in the area of commercial law. In order to
do so, the drafters not only included this goal within section 1-102(2),' 5 but
specifically and deliberately included Comments to the Code which detail the
policy underlying each particular code section. By deciding under section 1-207
that the common law doctrine of accord and satisfaction no longer applies to
full payment checks, the Ohio Supreme Court has clearly, and wrongly,
decided to ignore the purpose underlying the Code. And while this court
"believes" the Ohio General Assembly promulgated UCC section 1-207 in
response to a perceived injustice to creditors,116 "a jurisdiction which either
did not adopt the New York Study Commission's report or which conducted its
own analysis of the Code could not have given any indication to its legislature
that a change of the common-law rule was intended." 117
Although "[t]he common law rule may seem draconian, ...it is not
without reason. The 'full payment' check has provided a method for both
distraught debtors and aggrieved consumers to settle disputes without
litigation" for decades."18 By construing UCC section 1-207 as applicable to
the full payment check, the Ohio high court severely hampered a common
means of out-of-court settlement for commercial disputes and enhanced the
potential for increased litigation. Full payment checks are not forced upon
creditors, who, under the common law, have the option of accepting the
conditioned check and its terms or rejecting the offer in its entirety. In fact, any
perceived unfairness to the creditor may actually result "from a failure to
recognize the identity of a full payment check as useful and valuable settlement
mechanism. Any overreaching by the debtor was resolved by common law and
can be resolved under the Code through the duty of good faith expressed in
114 Dilemma Revisited, supra note 1, at 443.
115 See note 88 for the text of UCC § 1-102(2).
116 AFC Interiors, 46 Ohio St. 3d at 4, 544 N.E.2d at 871. The Ohio Revised Code
§ 1301.13 lists no legislative history.
117 See Walter, supra note 1, at 101 (footnote omitted).
118 Charleston Urban Renewal Auth. v. Stanley, 346 S.E.2d 740, 743 (W. Va. 1985);
cf, AFC Interiors, 46 Ohio St. 3d at 7, 544 N.E.2d at 874 (dissent).
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section 1-203."119 Under the Ohio Supreme Court's ruling, however, the
debtor now bears all the risks, for her only options are to sue or be sued.120
Such a result was not intended by the drafters of section 1-207, and such a
result should not have been intended by the Ohio Supreme Court.
Kimm A. Massengill
119 Fry, supra note 1, at 382. UCC § 1-203 provides that "[e]very contract or duty
within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement."
UCC § 1-203.
120 Comment, UCC Section 1-207 and the Full Payment Check: The Struggle Between
the Code and the Common Law- Where do the Debtor and Creditor Fit In?, 7 U. DAYTON
L. REV. 421, 433-34 (1982).
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